Currently, Asia's influence in global financial governance is not consistent with its weight in the world economy. This paper examines the role of Asia in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Group of Twenty (G-20). It looks in particular at how the relationship between East Asian countries and the IMF has evolved since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and outlines how Asian regional arrangements for crisis financing and economic surveillance could constructively interact with the IMF in the future. It also considers ways to enhance the effectiveness of Asian countries in the G-20 process.
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with Thailand (August 1997), Indonesia (November 1997 , August 1998 , and Korea (December 1997).
The conditionality contained in these programs was seen as overly harsh and intrusive and this soured the relationship. Asian countries were convinced that the Fund had misdiagnosed the problems the countries were facing and imposed excessively harsh and inappropriate conditions for the financing it was providing. Despite the fact that the Fund later on acknowledged the mistakes it has made during the Asian financial crisis, and changed its views, the damage had been done and the mistrust of the Fund by the Asian countries lingered. It remains to be seen whether the relationship is back on an even keel, although there are signs that it is improving. There was a positive change in the relationship in the context of the global financial crisis in 2008-09. While Asian countries made it perfectly clear that they would not engage in programs of any type with the Fund, they supported the Fund in its borrowing arrangements and in quota increases (which of course, Asian countries stood to benefit from the most).
The stigma of being associated with the Fund, however, has still to disappear, although with the Fund having changed considerably from the days of the financial crisis, Asian countries should reconsider their attitude toward the Fund. Indeed, they can engage more fully with the Fund, and therefore influence its policies and decisions, without sacrificing their regional interests.
evolution of Asia's relationship with the fund

Conditionality
When Thailand devalued in July 1997, the Fund was quick to offer a program with substantial financial support. As the crisis spread across Asia, programs were also negotiated with Indonesia and Korea in rapid succession. By the end of 1997 all three countries had programs with the Fund. Malaysia, which was facing the same problems of large-scale outflows of portfolio capital and exchange rate pressures as the other three countries, decided not to have a Fund program and adopted a different strategy. 2 1. For example, as recently as July 2010, the former Managing Director of the Fund, Dominique Strauss-Kahn (2010), stated "We have made mistakes. But we also learned from our experience during the Asian crisis." 2. One of the key and controversial features of the Malaysian strategy was the imposition of capital controls. There is still debate on whether these controls were effective in enabling Malaysia to recover from the crisis more rapidly than its neighbors that went down the program road. See, for example, Johnson et al. (2006) .
It is fair to say that the Fund saw the Asian financial crisis basically as a currency crisis and the policies in the programs that were implemented were accordingly designed. In a standard currency crisis triggered by speculators believing that the currency is overvalued, the standard prescription is to tighten monetary and fiscal policies and let the exchange rate go. This is precisely what the Fund prescribed. The Fund realized soon after that countries were facing a banking crisis as well. In the banking crisis case, the appropriate remedy would be to pump liquidity into the system through easier monetary policy and maintain aggregate demand through fiscal stimulus-exactly the opposite of the policies the Fund had initially included in the programs.
Several factors were at work in causing a substantial drop in aggregate demand and growth; the collapse of exchange rates and stock markets, the bursting of real estate bubbles, and capital flight. In such circumstances, fiscal austerity compounded the problems and growth rates fell sharply. The initial fiscal tightening prescribed by the Fund was eased once it became evident that fiscal austerity was unlikely to generate sufficient resources in the context of declining growth rates. But the initial shock of fiscal tightening was considered to be severe and in retrospect it was the wrong policy.
The Fund also expected that higher interest rates from a tighter monetary policy stance would lead to a reversal of capital flows, or at least reduce the outflow. But the Fund underestimated the impact of higher interest rates on businesses that had built up substantial debts and had very high debt-to-equity ratios. Higher interest rates led to widespread bankruptcies, which put banks that had loans to these businesses on their books under stress. The depreciation of the exchange rate further compounded the problem as a large proportion of the borrowings had been in foreign currency, and the fall in exchange rates dramatically increased the domestic-currency servicing costs of the loans.
In sum, many in Asia believe that the Fund bore considerable responsibility for the severity and length of the Asian financial crisis. It misdiagnosed the crisis and then implemented policies that aggravated the situation. It has to be acknowledged that the Fund did reverse itself and Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea did come out of the crisis in much better shape. But the bitter taste of the initial macro conditionality remained.
Equally, and perhaps more important was the structural conditionality that was incorporated in the programs with Asian countries. Generally speaking there was a major proliferation of structural conditions in Fund programs since the early 1990s. This process began when the Fund was involved in a host of programs with the transition countries in Eastern and Central Europe. These countries were looking to move from state-controlled economies to market economies and as a result they needed major institutional, legal, and regulatory reforms. This pattern of having a wide range of structural conditions was also followed in the case of the Asian countries, even though these countries were quite different.
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As pointed out by Goldstein (2001) , the number of structural policy conditions included in the programs with three Asian crisis countries was much larger than had been included on average in all Fund programs over the period 1996-99. The number of structural policy conditions (at the peak) amounted to 140 for Indonesia, over 90 for Korea, and over 70 for Thailand. For all Fund programs during 1996-99, the average was about 50 structural conditions. 3 The expansion of structural conditions limited the scope for domestic policy choices, thereby reducing country ownership. There is considerable validity in the reasons advanced for the expansion in Fund structural conditionality. 4 But at the same time, it must be noted that many structural reforms are microeconomic in nature and thus are likely to be more intrusive than macroeconomic policies. Country ownership of programs is essential for the design and implementation of these microeconomic measures, since they have a differential impact on various segments and vested interests in society.
Around 2000, in the immediate aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, it was generally felt that the Fund had gone too far in structural conditionality and overloaded programs with structural measures.
Many structural reforms are not critical for the achievement of macroeconomic stability. There is also no evidence that programs with a greater number of structural conditions have been more successful.
In fact, as shown in IMF (2001c), programs with more structural conditions have the same success rate as those with fewer conditions. 6 Khan and Sharma (2003) argue that the two main dangers of increased structural conditions are, first, that they result in reduced country ownership of programs and therefore impair their effectiveness. And second, the failure to implement structural reforms that are not critical for macroeconomic stability may undermine confidence in the overall program, which could trigger reactions in domestic and international capital markets that could make the overall program objectives more difficult to achieve.
Based on the experience of the Asian programs, it became clear that much more thought should be given to what structural reforms are critical to achieving the principal objectives of the program.
These reforms will undoubtedly vary from country to country, but sharply pruning the list of structural conditions is possible without jeopardizing the success of the program or the ability of the Fund to be repaid. In other words, prioritizing or streamlining structural conditionality does not mean weakened overall conditionality.
3. This has been tabulated in Goldstein (2001 ) and IMF (2001c ). 4. See IMF (2001a , 2001b , 2001c .
5. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between IMF conditionality and country ownership of programs, see Khan and Sharma (2003) .
6. See also Lamdany (2009) , which drew on a report of the Independent Evaluation Office of the Fund.
By 2001 the Fund acknowledged that structural conditionality in programs had expanded too much, and a major effort was made to streamline it. This effort was led by the new Managing Director of the Fund, Horst Kohler. An Interim Guidance Note on Streamlining Structural Conditionality was issued, which defined broadly the principles to determine the appropriate scope of structural conditionality in programs (IMF 2001b, box 3) . In summary, these principles are:
n Structural reforms that are critical for the achievement of the program's macroeconomic objectives will generally have to be covered by IMF conditionality.
n Structural reforms that are relevant-but not critical-for the program's macroeconomic objectives and within the IMF's core areas of responsibility may be subject to conditionality.
n If structural reforms meet the macro-relevance test but are neither critical nor in the IMF's core areas of responsibility, IMF conditionality would generally not apply.
These proposals represented an important move by the Fund away from a concept of comprehensiveness of structural conditionality to one of parsimony. It is interesting to note that the experience with programs negotiated after the issuance of the new Interim Guidance Note showed no falloff in the success rate of programs (Lamdany 2009 ).
The 2007 Surveillance Decision
The Fund viewed the adoption of the 2007 Surveillance Decision in June 2007 as a "landmark" in surveillance over the policies of member countries (IMF 2009) . While the decision covered the whole range of policies, including monetary, fiscal, and financial-sector policies, greater attention was given to exchange rate issues. The Decision was expected to result in increased candor in assessing member country's economic situation, outlook, and policies to achieve internal and external stability.
In reality, the decision in a sense simply restated the Fund's mandate to exercise surveillance over a member country's economic policies while putting exchange rates at the forefront. Unfortunately, problems arose precisely in the exchange rate area. While it was a positive step that Fund staff was required to be more candid in its assessment of a country's exchange rate policies, and particularly the appropriateness of the level of the exchange rate, this issue turned out to be difficult and highly contentious. The problem essentially was twofold: the "labels" that were to be attached to a country's exchange rate policy; and the methodology for assessing the level of the exchange rate.
Labels
Under the 2007 Surveillance Decision, the focus of exchange rate assessments should be to determine if the level of the real effective exchange rate (REER) is broadly consistent with the sustainability of the 7 current account, or equivalently, with an equilibrium evolution of the country's net external assets. The current level of the REER is compared with the level that would result in a current account position consistent with a stable net external asset position, adjusting for temporary factors affecting the current account balance. The difference between these two is the degree of misalignment.
The decision then went further and introduced the concept of a "fundamental misalignment" of the exchange rate. An exchange rate is fundamentally misaligned if evidence of a significant and permanent misalignment can be established. 7 Staff was expected to include the term "fundamental misalignment" in reports whenever it found that this criteria established by the Decision was met. If not, staff would use the term "broadly in equilibrium" or "misaligned" (overvalued or undervalued).
Methodology
The concept of an equilibrium exchange rate, and therefore the degree of misalignment of the current exchange rate, presupposes the existence of a suitable methodology to calculate it. The Decision relied on the work of the Fund's Coordinating Group on Exchange Rates (CGER) to operationalize this concept.
CGER outlines three approaches to estimate the equilibrium real exchange rate: 8 n The macro balance approach, which compares the current account in the medium term with a so-called current account norm;
n The external sustainability approach, which compares the medium term current account with the current account balance that would stabilize the net external assets position; and n The equilibrium real effective exchange rate approach, which directly relates the REER to fundamentals.
The first two approaches were considered directly related to the framework of the Decision, while the third was expected to be a useful check on the results from the macro balance and external sustainability approaches. Of course, it was recognized that additional country-specific information and judgment would also play an important role in the assessment of the exchange rate. Nevertheless, the CGER methodology was considered as providing a strong basis for determining whether a country's exchange rate was in equilibrium, misaligned, or fundamentally misaligned.
Many member countries were uncomfortable with the Decision when it came time to implement it. 9 They were particularly concerned with the label of "fundamental misalignment." The opposition 7. The Decision, however, did not indicate a numerical value for "significant misalignment," although it did say that "permanent" referred to the medium term.
8. See Lee et al. (2008) .
9. Even though the Executive Board of the IMF had approved this Decision in June 2007.
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came from Asian countries, among which China and Malaysia felt the Decision was largely directed at them and other countries with fixed exchange rates. 10 They were joined by several major oil producers (mainly those in the Gulf ) that were also maintaining dollar pegs and running very large current account surpluses at that time. 11 Essentially, their argument was that the CGER methodology had high degree of uncertainty and that assessments based on this methodology could be very misleading, if not altogether wrong. None of these countries were ready to be branded as fundamentally misaligned on the basis of what they considered inappropriate methodology (in the case of oil producers) or uncertain estimates that emerged from applying the methodology (in the case of Asian countries maintaining fixed exchange rates).
Because of this opposition very little was achieved in applying the exchange rate aspects of the Decision during 2007-08. The first country to be labeled as fundamentally misaligned was Maldives, which had a dollar peg and was running current account deficits. 12 It is interesting to note that the Fund's Executive Board rejected the staff's determination of Maldives' exchange rate as being fundamentally misaligned. Many Executive Directors, including all the developing-country Directors, asserted that adequate information was not available to make such a determination. The other countries that were
proposed by the staff to be similarly labeled simply delayed completing the Article IV Consultations so that their cases could not be brought to the Executive Board of the Fund.
The Fund attempted to break the deadlock in 2008 with the proposal of the Managing Director to have "ad hoc" consultations for those countries where there was prima facie evidence that the exchange rate was fundamentally misaligned. This group included China and Malaysia in Asia and the major Gulf oil producers, including Saudi Arabia. However, even this did not help conclude long-delayed consultations with China and Malaysia. In the case of the oil producers, Fund staff dropped the fundamental misalignment label and simply referred to the exchange rates as being undervalued, noting that the country authorities did not agree with even this label, arguing that their policy plans, specifically fiscal policies, would eliminate this overvaluation in time. As a result of this compromise, the outstanding Article IV Consultations with the oil producers were completed in 2008.
Given the impasse, and recognition by the Fund that there were problems with the Decision, key aspects of it were changed in 2009 (IMF 2009). A revised guidance to staff was issued eliminating the requirement to use the term fundamental misalignment but still calling for a clear and candid discussion 10. In other words, several countries felt that this was an underhanded way for the Fund to push for flexible exchange rates.
11. It should be recalled that oil prices rose sharply in 2007 and the first half of 2008, giving rise to dramatic increases in the value of oil exports.
12. It was unfortunate that such a small country was to be the first test case. In 2007 the GDP of Maldives was just about $1 billion.
of the exchange rate. The proposal to use ad hoc consultations was also withdrawn as it was no longer relevant given the elimination of the label of fundamental misalignment. The Fund also explicitly recognized the uncertainties underlying the assessment of the level of the exchange rate and allowed government policy intentions over the medium term to be taken into account in the assessment.
With these changes, which were approved by the Executive Board on 
fund "stigma" in Asia
The extreme reluctance of Asian countries to borrow from the Fund, and their wariness with respect to its policy advice and surveillance, for reasons discussed above, is now widely described as a "stigma." This stigma is manifest in the reluctance of governments to turn to the Fund in the 2008-09 global economic crisis. As discussed previously, it cannot be denied that the IMF is unpopular in East Asia and often dismissed in elite discourse among policymakers within the region. However, three observations are in order.
First, this stigma is a constructed collective attitude, which means it is not only the product of popular political backlash against the institution that attended painful adjustment requirements during 1997-98. The aversion to the Fund has also to a significant extent been cultivated by influential people and institutions within the region and reinforced by elite discourse.
Second, the stigma is based on a selective reading of the Asian crisis and is backward looking. IMF conditionality during 1997-98 contained serious mistakes, but other elements of conditionality-such as the elimination of the overvaluation of currencies and large current account deficits, consolidation of the banking sector, and strengthening of financial regulation-were certainly appropriate. There can be no dispute about the numerical dominance of the European members in the Fund or their influence over its operations. Nor is there any dispute with the argument that the Asian programs of 1997-98 were underfunded and laden with conditions that proved in some cases to be mistaken.
Furthermore, it is also a fact that when leading countries such as the United States encountered their own crisis they followed policies that they had rejected for the emerging markets in 1997. But it can be argued that Asian officials should also acknowledge a number of additional considerations. own way" in crisis finance. But, the most important factor that gave weight to Asian views in the IMF was the impressive growth of the region, to which the IMF wants to be relevant, and its rising weight in the world economy. The IMF is a very different creature now than it was in 1997 because it has responded to Asia.
Third, that European borrowers are the first members to benefit from these far-reaching reforms at the Fund is ironic. Given the stigma attached to borrowing from the IMF in East Asia, however, this is not a coincidence. In the absence of this stigma, it is quite possible that both Korea and Indonesia would have borrowed from the Fund in late 2008 and/or early 2009. The Fund staff has been quietly urging Asian governments to apply for some of the new facilities, the FCL in particular, but so far to no avail.
Therefore, the fact that Asian governments have not borrowed from the IMF on the newly favorable terms is in significant measure a matter of choice.
Fourth, the precedents set in the euro area programs and the experience of cooperating closely with the euro area authorities will inform the Fund's response to contingencies in other regions, including
Asia. Southeast Asian countries can rely on these precedents if and when they next appeal for access to the IMF. Due to the stigma of the Fund in the region and the region's present external surpluses and financial stability it is unlikely that the larger emerging-market countries will draw in the immediate future.
But that does not imply that the days of IMF lending to developing and emerging markets in Asia are completely over.
Iv. GovernAnce of the fund
Historically, Asia has had a less prominent position in the governance of the IMF than either Europe or the United States. Despite periodic review, the adjustment of quotas and voting shares for member countries has lagged far behind changes in relative economic position, which has operated to the disadvantage of the fast-growing countries of East Asia in particular. Over the last decade, however, there has been a concerted effort to redress this discrepancy and that effort has produced significant results. The the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), greater regional solidarity might have been expected during this process. Dominique Strauss-Kahn's departure for reasons related to French domestic politics was widely expected in early 2011, well before his eventual resignation in May. The absence of regional solidarity in selecting a successor was thus not likely due to being taken by surprise but to more fundamental political factors, including competition between China and Japan. Overcoming these divisions will be critical to Asia's one day securing the Managing Director position.
v. fInAncInG And surveIllAnce
Asian countries' reservations about the Fund have led ASEAN+3 to develop regional arrangements for crisis financing and economic surveillance. These arrangements change the international financial architecture for the region in important ways. Contrary to the hopes of some, though, they cannot be relied upon alone to provide financial stability; instead, they will have to work with the IMF and other multilateral institutions for the time being. This section considers the development of these arrangements and the avenues for cooperation with the Fund.
financing 16
In response to the experience of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, the ten countries of ASEAN and the three Northeast Asian states (ASEAN+3) launched the CMI, a network of bilateral swap arrangements on which members could draw in the event of another crisis. In 2009, the ASEAN+3 finance ministers decided to "multilateralise" the CMI, by which they meant collectivize on a regional basis. The CMIM became formally operational in March 2010.
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Several aspects about the CMIM are worth noting. First, the 13 countries plus Hong Kong commit a total of $120 billion to the facility, giving them the right to draw in various proportions of their quota.
Second, this is a "self-managed reserve pooling arrangement," which means that foreign exchange reserves are held in separate national accounts but earmarked for contributions to financial rescue packages. The CMIM can thus be understood as an agreement on joint decision-making to disburse from the national accounts simultaneously. Third, the CMIM necessitated agreement on the governing arrangements, including the relative shares of Japan, China, and Korea. Japan and China, in which Hong Kong's share is included, have equal shares under this agreement. By making lending decisions with a two-thirds vote, one of the large countries could in principle be outvoted-which represents a potentially important commitment to regional decision-making. Fourth, the CMIM retains a provision of the CMI known as the "IMF link," requiring a country to have an IMF program before it can borrow more than 20 percent of its allotment under the CMIM. Finally, and as a partial consequence of this IMF link, neither the CMI nor the CMIM has been activated as of now. The prevalence of current account surpluses and abundant reserves and the relative absence of plain vanilla balance-of-payments crises help to explain nonactivation.
But governments in the region were also dissuaded from tapping the CMI or CMIM owing to the need for a Fund program to do so.
Asian financial regionalism has been deeply ambivalent about the IMF, motivated by resentment of the institution yet facilitated by its presence. The IMF link inhibited the use of these arrangements in the recent crisis, owing to the "stigma" of the Fund in Asia. At the same time, the CMIM is too small to be viable in a crisis without additional financing from other sources, with the IMF being the leading candidate to provide it. So, if the CMIM is going to be used in the foreseeable future and evolve, it will have to specify the modalities for working with the IMF. By the same token, the future of the IMF depends in part on repairing the damaged relations with this fast-growing region. Rehabilitating the institution within Asia is facilitated by modifying its facilities and programs to better match the preferences of Asian members, an area where it has arguably made great strides, and cooperating with regional institutions including CMIM and AMRO, which can impart greater local ownership of operations. Cooperation is thus important for both Asia and the IMF.
There are several ways in which Asian regional arrangements could cooperate with the IMF for their mutual benefit. First, they can do so through traditional balance-of-payments financing arrangements.
Under such arrangements, the IMF and CMIM could disburse to countries that have negotiated an SBA with the Fund. This is the contingency that was envisaged as CMI and CMIM were established.
ASEAN+3 and the IMF have recently discussed and settled upon the procedures for coordinating their policies and disbursements under this scenario.
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While there might be countries in the region that encounter a traditional balance-of-payments crisis, the region could well experience crises more closely resembling the contingencies of the 2008-09 crisesthe seizing up of capital and bank-funding markets, the imminent collapse of a too-big-to-fail bank or another large private financial institution, and the need for cross-border liquidity support. The IMF has equipped itself for these contingencies with the adoption of the FCL and Precautionary Credit Line (PCL), and is further considering a Global Stabilization Mechanism (GSM) or a Short-Term Liquidity Line (SLL). 19 Owing to the problem of stigma, however, no East Asian country has applied for either of these "precautionary" facilities. 19. Under the enhanced FCL, countries with "very strong economic fundamentals" and policies can qualify for an IMF credit line, on which they can draw at their option without submitting to ex post conditionality. See, for example, IMF, One of us (Henning 2009 ) has argued that qualification for the FCL should be deemed to satisfy the ASEAN+3 requirement that most disbursements under the CMIM be linked to a Fund program.
In taking such a decision, the ASEAN+3 finance ministers could mobilize the CMIM for precautionary purposes, which is not possible under the present CMIM agreement. Such a decision would also make the FCL more attractive to Asian members and probably soften the stigma of the Fund. Similar cooperation could be envisaged with IMF lending through a PCL.
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Former Thai Minister of Finance Chalongphob Sussangkarn (2010) raises another intriguing possibility for engaging outsiders in cooperation among ASEAN+3. He suggests creating associate memberships or contributing partnerships in the CMIM in order to allow Australia, New Zealand, and/ or India to participate short of full membership status. While not sitting in the governing bodies of the CMIM, nor eligible to borrow from it, these countries could contribute funds during an activation and attend surveillance and other meetings through associated status.
The concept could be taken a step further to allow countries outside the region, such as the United
States, and multilateral institutions, such as the IMF, to participate. The possibility that the IMF might top up financial packages by bilateral lending to members of a regional arrangement and by lending directly to the regional arrangement itself has been floated within the Fund (IMF 2010). However, such a step would have to overcome institutional and policy obstacles at both the IMF (stemming from concerns about control) and ASEAN+3 (which is not empowered to borrow).
surveillance
ASEAN+3 has also been engaged in a parallel negotiation to strengthen the regional regime of economic and financial surveillance. The hope of many is that a robust surveillance mechanism would permit the CMIM to eventually lend without the borrower also negotiating an IMF program. Such a step would complete the transition of East Asian financial arrangements to an Asian Monetary Fund. Accordingly, in June 2011, ASEAN+3 created an independent secretariat in 2011 in Singapore, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office. While this is a significant step, an institution on which ASEAN+3 can build, the group would have to endow it with more resources and analytical capacity before it could serve as the functional equivalent of the IMF bureaucracy and thus permit the region to go it alone in a crisis.
Mexico: Arrangement under the Flexible Credit Line, IMF Country Report no. 11/11, January 2011, available at www.imf. org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1111.pdf. Mexico requested and was granted access up to 15 times its quota.
20. The PCL applies to countries "with good policies but still facing some remaining vulnerabilities," which would therefore have to commit to light ex post conditionality and be monitored. IMF, "IMF Enhances Crisis Prevention Toolkit," press release no. 10/321, August 30, 2010, available at www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10321.htm.
Regional surveillance of economic policy has developed gradually over more than a decade within ASEAN+3. 21 Consensus emerged only within the last few years on the creation of an independent secretariat to conduct policy reviews and on the secretariat's location. In spring 2010, ASEAN+3 finance ministers decided that AMRO would become operational in 2011 and be located in Singapore. It is useful to underscore that the development of regional surveillance has critical ramifications for East Asia's long-term relationship to the IMF. At the outset of the CMI, Asian officials acknowledged that surveillance would have to evolve in parallel with regional financial facilities if the region were to become genuinely self-reliant. ASEAN+3 would have to develop the analytical capacity to define the group's own policy conditionality for CMIM. Although AMRO is yet to be tested, it does not appear that ASEAN+3
officials have yet devoted the resources or mustered the commitment to raise regional surveillance to this level. For the time being, therefore, it appears that any activation of the CMIM will have to be in conjunction with IMF lending.
vI. conclusIon
Asia's role in the IMF-the premier institution of global financial governance-has been limited.
Given the size and strength of Asia in the global economy, it could reasonably be argued that the region "punches below its weight." This is partly the result of a conscious choice by Asian countries to keep the Fund at arm's length, reflecting the bitter memories of the Fund's role in the Asian financial crisis. But it is also due to the fact that Asia has not, at least until recently, pushed to have a larger say in global financial circles.
There are welcome signs now of Asia asserting itself and demanding greater voice and representation in the Fund through increases in quotas and shares. But, as in any zero-sum game, if Asia is to gain shares in the Fund, some others will have to see their shares reduced. The losers will mainly be the Europeans 23. A recent report by the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO 2011) suggests that there is substantial room to debate the conclusions of the Fund regarding its ability to assess financial soundness. The report mainly criticizes staff and the Executive Board for failing to sound alarms when warnings were necessary, rather than vice versa. 
